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Crises have been a feature of the financial landscape for hundreds of years. They often appear without warning as the sub-prime mortgage crisis of August 2007 illustrates.
1 A good example of a crisis is provided by the Asian crisis of 1997-98. The 'Dragons' (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan,) and the 'Tigers'
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) were models of successful economic development. From the early 1950's until the eve of the crisis in 1997, their economies grew at high rates. In 1997 the Thai baht came under sustained pressure and, on July 2, the government stopped defending it. The value of the currency immediately fell 14 percent in the onshore market and 19 percent in the offshore market (Fourçans and Franck, 2003, Chapter 10) . This marked the beginning of the Asian financial crises.
The next currencies to come under pressure were the Philippine peso and the Malaysian ringitt. The Philippine central bank tried to defend the peso by raising interest rates. Despite the government's action it lost $1.5 billion in foreign reserves. On July 11, the government let the peso float and it promptly fell 11.5 percent. The Malaysian central bank stopped defending the ringitt on July 11. The Indonesian central bank stopped defending the rupee on August 14.
The countries known as the Dragons were also affected by the spreading crisis. At the beginning of August, Singapore decided not to defend its currency and by the end of September the Singapore dollar had fallen 8 percent. Taiwan also decided to let their currency depreciate and were not much affected. Hong Kong had a currency board that pegged the exchange rate to the US dollar. The Hong Kong dollar came under attack, but the currency board was able to maintain the peg. Initially, the South Korean won appreciated against other South East Asian currencies; however, in November the won The data set for the first three periods comprises 21 countries and, for the recent period, data for the original 21 as well as an expanded group of 56.
The Recent Period
Bordo et al. define a banking crisis as a period of financial distress that is severe enough to result in the erosion of most or all of the capital in the banking system. A currency crisis is defined as a forced change in parity, abandonment of a pegged exchange rate, or an international rescue. A twin crisis consists of both a banking crisis and a currency crisis. Bordo et al. define the duration of a crisis as the amount of time before GDP growth returns to the trend rate of GDP growth for the five years preceding the start of the crisis. Finally, they measure the depth of the crisis by summing the output loss relative to trend for the duration of the crisis. Figure 1 shows the frequency of crises in the four periods. Using the data for the original 21 countries, it can be seen that the Interwar Years were the worst of the four periods. This is perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that the Great Depression affected most countries in that period. Banking crises, in particular, were more prevalent during this period than in the other periods.
The Bretton Woods Period was very different from the other periods.
After the Great Depression, policymakers in most countries were determined not to allow such an event to happen again. They imposed severe regulations on banks or brought them under state control to prevent them from taking much risk. As a result, banking crises were almost completely eliminated during the Bretton Woods Period. A twin crisis occurred in Brazil in 1962 but, apart from that episode, there were no banking crises during the entire period. There were frequent currency crises, but these mostly occurred because macroeconomic policies were inconsistent with the level of the fixed exchange rates set in the Bretton Woods system.
Interestingly, the most benign of the four periods was the Gold Standard Era . Banking crises did occur in this period, but they were infrequent. Currency crises and twin crises also occurred much less frequently than in subsequent periods. The global financial system was fairly open at this time, which suggests that globalization does not inevitably lead to crises. The incidence of crises in the Recent Period was not as high as in the Interwar Years, but was nevertheless fairly high. Banking and twin crises were more frequent in the Recent Period than in every period except the Interwar Years and currency crises were much more frequent. The incidence of crises in the Recent
Period is even more striking if we use the sample of 56 countries as the basis of comparison. The countries added to create the larger sample are mostly emerging markets, which suggests that emerging markets are more prone to crises, particularly currency crises, than the older sample of 21 countries. Table 1 shows the average duration and depth of crises, broken out by type of crisis and by period and sample. Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 1 is the short duration and shallow depth of crises during the Bretton Woods Period. Another distinctive feature is the greater severity of twin crises in terms of lost output. As might be expected, crises were more severe during the Interwar Years than in the other periods.
Although they did not last longer than in the other periods, the cumulative loss in output from these crises was higher. During the Gold Standard Era, by contrast with other periods, the duration and cumulative loss of crises were unremarkable. In the Recent Period, twin crises were characterized by long durations and significant output losses. Figure 2 shows the effect on recessions of having a bank or currency crisis at the same time. It can be seen that recessions that coincide with crises have a much higher loss of GDP than recessions that do not coincide with crises. This was particularly true in the Interwar Years. Also, the average recovery time is somewhat higher in recessions that coincide with crises than in recessions that do not coincide with crises.
In summary, the analysis of Bordo et al. (2001) suggests the following conclusions.
• Banking crises, currency crises, and twin crises have occurred under a variety of different monetary and regulatory regimes.
• Over the last 120 years, crises have been followed by economic downturns lasting from 2 to 3 years and costing 5 to 10 percent of GDP, on average.
• Twin crises are associated with particularly large output losses.
• Recessions that coincide with crises are more severe than recessions that do not coincide with crises.
• In retrospect, the Bretton Woods Period appears to be quite special.
Countries either regulated bank balance sheets to prevent them from taking on much risk or achieved the same aim through direct ownership of banks. These measures were successful in suppressing banking crises and there was only one twin crisis during this period.
• The Interwar Years were also special. Banking crises and currency crises were widespread. Moreover, the output losses from banking and currency crises were severe, especially when they coincided to form a twin crisis.
• The Recent Period does indeed appear more crisis-prone than any other period except for the Interwar Years. In particular, it seems more crisis-prone than the Gold Standard Era, the last time that capital markets were globalized as they are now.
Explaining Crises
Two broad approaches have been adopted by economists in their attempt to understand the crises that occurred in these periods. Both approaches have a long history. One view, well expounded by Kindleberger (1978) , is that crises occur spontaneously as the result of mob psychology or panic. If everyone expects a crisis and acts as if one is about to occur, then the crisis becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Conversely, if no one expects a crisis, this expectation is also self-fulfilling and no crisis occurs. A second view asserts that crises are an intrinsic part of the business cycle and result from shocks to economic fundamentals (see, e.g., Mitchell, 1941) . When the economy goes into a recession or depression, asset returns are expected to fall. Borrowers will have difficulty repaying loans and depositors, anticipating an increase in defaults or non-performing loans, will try to protect their wealth by withdrawing banks deposits. Banks are caught between the illiquidity of their assets (loans) and the liquidity of their liabilities (deposits) and may become insolvent. The result is the same as in the panic story, but the cause is different.
There is a large empirical literature on historical banking crises, which we briefly touch on here. Sprague (1910) is the classic study of crises in the US during the National Banking Era Gorton (1988, reprinted as Reading 2) conducts an empirical study to differentiate between the panic view and the business cycle view of banking crises, using data from the National Banking Era. He found evidence consistent with the view that banking panics can be predicted by the business cycle. Table 2 shows recessions and crises occurring in the US during the National Banking Era. It also shows the percentage changes in the currency/deposit ratio and in pig iron production (as a proxy for GDP) during each crisis. The five worst recessions, as measured by the change in pig iron production, were all accompanied by crises. Out of the total of eleven recessions, seven were accompanied by crises. Using the liabilities of failed businesses as a leading economic indicator, Gorton shows that crises were predictable events: whenever his leading economic indicator reached a certain threshold, a panic ensued. The stylized facts uncovered by Gorton thus suggest that, at least during the US National Banking Era, banking crises were triggered by the business cycle rather than some extraneous random variable. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) consider a broad range of evidence from the US National Banking Era and conclude that the data do not support the panic view. They find that, for the five episodes they focus on, stock prices fell the most during the pre-panic periods, suggesting that the crises were caused by fundamental factors. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) attach great importance to four banking crises in the early 1930's in advancing their view that bank failures were the result of panics.
They suggest these crises were important 'shocks' to the real economy and were significant factors in causing the Great Depression. 
II. Empirical Studies of Crises
As the historical overview above suggests, one of the most important consequences of financial crises is the heavy costs they impose on the real economy. The literature on the costs of crises and their resolution is large (see, e.g., Bordo et al. (2001) , Hoggarth et al. (2002) , Roubini and Setser (2004) , and Honohan and Laeven (2005)). Much of the debate in this literature is concerned with exactly how to measure costs. The early literature focused on fiscal costs, that is, how much it costs the government to recapitalize banks and reimburse insured depositors; however, these 'costs' are mostly transfers rather than true economic costs. The later literature focuses more on the loss of output relative to a benchmark such as trend growth rate.
When we look at the time series of the costs of crises, we notice two things: the first is the high average cost; the second is the large variation in costs. Boyd, Kwak and Smith (2005, reprinted here as Reading 4) estimate the average present value of losses in a number of different ways. Depending on the method used, the mean loss measures between 63 percent and 302 percent of the value of real per capita GDP in the year before the crisis starts. The range of losses is also large. In Canada, France, Germany, and the US, which experienced mild, non-systemic crises, there was no significant slowdown in growth; in other countries, the slowdown and discounted loss in output were extremely high. In Hong Kong, for example, the discounted losses were 1,041 percent of the value of real output the year before the crisis of 1997.
It is the large average costs and the high variability of these costs that makes policy makers so averse to crises and willing to go to great lengths to avoid them.
However, it is not clear that this policy is always optimal. There are also costs associated with regulation and some crises may not be very costly. In any case, one must weigh the costs and benefits of avoiding crises.
In an important paper, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, reprinted as Reading 5) investigate the relationship between banking crises and currency crises. They find that in the 1970's, when financial systems were highly regulated, currency crises did not coincide with banking crises. After the financial liberalization of the 1980's, however, currency crises and banking crises became intertwined. In the usual sequence of events, problems in the banking sector are followed by a currency crisis, which in turn exacerbates and deepens the banking crisis. Although banking crises typically precede currency crises, the common cause of both is usually a fall in asset values caused by a recession or weakness in the economy. Often the crisis is part of a boom-bust cycle that follows financial liberalization. It appears to be rare that banking crises and currency crises occur when economic fundamentals are sound.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Asian crises that started with the July 2, 1997 flotation of the Thai baht was how quickly the other countries were affected.
Within a short period of time, the crisis had spread to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the 
III. Models of Banking Crises
The first models of banking crises were developed by Bryant (1980, reprinted here as
Reading 7) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983, reprinted here as Reading 8) . Both models assume a continuum of consumers with random demand for liquidity. Optimal insurance against these liquidity shocks can be provided by deposit contracts that promise depositors a fixed payment depending on whether they withdraw early or late. The fixed liabilities in the form of deposit contracts make the banks vulnerable to bank runs. In the Diamond-Dybvig model, bank runs are triggered by sunspots, whereas in Bryant's model they are triggered by aggregate loan risk and asymmetric information about loan payoffs.
Both papers provide a justification for deposit insurance. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that deposit insurance eliminates the possibility of runs by removing the incentive for patient depositors to join bank runs. Furthermore, there is no cost since, in the absence of runs, there is no need to make insurance payouts to depositors. In Bryant's model, deposit insurance is desirable because it eliminates incentives to gather costly information that is not socially useful.
Panic-Based Models Cone (1983) and Jacklin (1987) Another crucial assumption of the bank-run models is the so-called 'sequentialservice' or 'first-come-first-served' constraint. An early criticism of the Diamond-Dybvig paper was that banks could survive a bank run by the simple expedient of suspending convertibility. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) responded by arguing that depositors would arrive at the bank sequentially and that the sequential-service constraint would require the banks to pay out as much as possible to the depositors who arrived first. In this way, the bank would exhaust its funds by the time it realized that a bank run was underway and before it could suspend convertibility.
A number of writers have sought to justify the existence of the sequential-service constraint endogenously, rather than by appealing to legal restrictions. Wallace (1988) assumes that the fraction of the population requiring liquidity is random. He also assumes that agents are spatially separated from each other, but are always in contact with the bank. These factors imply that a sequential-service constraint is optimal. Whereas Diamond and Dybvig (1983) were able to demonstrate the optimality of deposit insurance, deposit insurance is not optimal in Wallace's model. Building on Wallace's model, Chari (1989) considers what happens if the interbank market does not work well because of regulatory restrictions of the type in place during the National Banking era in the US. He shows that, in the presence of such regulatory restrictions, banking panics can occur. With a well functioning interbank market, however, runs do not occur.
Calomiris and Kahn (1991, reprinted here as Reading 9) provide another justification for demand deposits and the sequential-service, by showing that they provide depositors with an incentive to monitor the bank. In equilibrium, a fraction of depositors will have an incentive to gather information about the viability of the bank. If the bank is in poor shape, the informed depositors will discover this and withdraw their money. The sudden withdrawals will force the bank to liquidate all of its assets. In order to avoid this outcome, the bank has to maintain the value of its assets and avoid taking excessive risks.
Although maintaining idle cash balances is costly for the bank and monitoring is costly for depositors, the entire arrangement is incentive-efficient because it solves the bank's moral hazard problem. Diamond and Rajan (2001) provide another example of the optimality of demand deposits and the sequential-service constraint. In their setup, the possibility of bank runs ensures that banks will not renegotiate to extract more rents from entrepreneurs that borrow from the bank.
Models with Real (Intrinsic) Shocks
There is a large variety of models in which bank runs are triggered by real shocks to the economy. In Bryant's (1980) seminal model, there is asymmetric information about aggregate loan risk. Gorton's (1985) model assumes that depositors receive a noisy signal about the value of bank assets. If the signal suggests the value of assets is low, a bank run ensues. Solvent banks suspend convertibility and pay a cost to verify their solvency to investors. Chari and Jagannathan (1988) focus on a signal extraction problem, where part of the population observes a signal about future returns and others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received or whether liquidity needs happened to be high. Chari and Jagannathan (1988) are able to show bank runs occur not only when the outlook is poor but also when liquidity needs turn out to be high. Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) also consider a model where some depositors receive an interim signal about risk. They show that the optimality of bank deposits compared to equities depends on the characteristics of the risky investment.
Hellwig (1994) considers a model where the reinvestment rate is random and shows that the risk should be born both by early and late withdrawers. Alonso (1996) demonstrates using numerical examples that contracts where runs occur may be better than contracts which ensure runs do not occur, because bank runs improve risk sharing.
Allen and Gale (1998, reprinted here as Reading 10) develop a model of business cycle risk with symmetric information. They assume that the prospects of banks are observable, but not contractible. Motivated by Gorton's (1988) empirical findings, they assume that everyone, including depositors, can observe a leading economic indicator that is perfectly correlated with future asset returns. Banks invest in two kinds of assets, a risky, illiquid asset (the long asset) and a safe, liquid asset (the short asset). The short asset can also be held by individuals. Because the long asset is completely illiquid and cannot be liquidated, default causes no deadweight loss and the first-best allocation is achieved through a competitive banking system using demand deposit contracts. Bank runs are essential to achieving the first best because they introduce the optimal amount of state-contingency into the consumption allocation.
Allen and Gale (1998) consider several extensions of the basic model. If there is a cost to holding the liquid asset outside the banking system, the competitive banking outcome is no longer efficient; however, the first best can achieved if the central bank provides fiat money that can be held by the depositors as a substitute for the short asset.
A second extension introduces a market in which the long asset can be sold. The possibility of liquidating the long asset results in a significantly worse outcome. Banks are forced to unload their illiquid assets at fire-sale prices. Although this transfer of value to speculators is ex post efficient, it is inefficient ex ante because of the risk it imposes on the banks and their depositors. Again, efficiency can be restored through a central bank intervention.
Allen and Gale (2004, reprinted here as Reading 11) develop a general equilibrium framework for understanding the normative aspects of crises. This framework is used to investigate the welfare properties of financial systems and to discover conditions under which regulation might improve the allocation of resources.
An interesting feature of the Allen-Gale framework is that it explicitly models the interaction of banks and markets. it is impossible to Pareto-improve on the laisser-faire allocation of resources as long as the markets for aggregate risk are complete. In this case, we say that the laisser-faire allocation is constrained efficient. Again, the invisible hand has worked its magic in the market and there is no need for government intervention. Unlike the equilibrium with complete contracts, an equilibrium with incomplete contracts may involve default. For example, if a bank uses a deposit contract, it may be optimal for the bank to make promises that it cannot keep in some states of nature. Then there can be a banking crisis, in the sense that banks default and are forced to liquidate assets. This is not a market failure because, as we have seen, the incidence of financial crises is constrained efficient.
The proceeding benchmarks show that financial crises are not always a bad thing;
however, the assumption of complete markets is crucial here. Without this assumption, market failure is possible and some regulation to prevent or manage financial crises may be needed. The form of the optimal intervention is an open question. It may not resemble the regulation we see in practice.
Equilibrium Selection
Because of the presence of multiple equilibria, especially in models that assume banking panics are sunspot phenomena, equilibrium selection becomes a critical issue. Models without a unique equilibrium have limited predictive power and ambiguous comparative static properties. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) This will force banks to liquidate some of their assets, resulting in a further fall in asset prices in an illiquid market. It can be shown that the price of risky assets is determined by 'cash-in-the-market' pricing in some states and can fall below their fundamental value.
This leads to an inefficient allocation of resources. The central bank can eliminate this inefficiency by an appropriate injection of liquidity into the market.
Money and Crises
Most models of banking crises ignore the role of money. Banks contract with depositors in real terms. As discussed above, Allen and Gale (1998) show how the use of nominal deposit contracts and the injection of money by a central bank can prevent crises or, at least, ensure the consequences are innocuous. Variations in the price level act as a substitute for state contingent contracts and allow risk to be shared optimally.
Smith ( We have only touched on some highlights of the literature on banking crises here.
For further reading, excellent surveys are provided by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) , Freixas and Rochet (1997) , and Gorton and Winton (2003) .
IV. Currency Crises
The first generation currency crisis models were designed to explain the problems experienced by a number of Latin American countries in the 1970's and early 1980's.
The distinguishing feature of these episodes was that they had their origins in macroeconomic imbalances. The classic papers of Krugman (1979, reprinted as Reading 16) and Flood and Garber (1984, reprinted as Reading 17) show how a fixed exchange rate plus a government budget deficit leads to a currency crisis. In equilibrium, the exchange rate cannot change discontinuously because this would lead to an arbitrage opportunity. Instead, the exchange rate adjusts continuously so that the real rate of return on domestic currency is equated to the real rate of return on foreign currency. The fiscal deficit is covered by a combination of depletion of foreign reserves and an inflation tax on the domestic money stock. When the exchange rate reaches its long-run equilibrium level, that is, the level that can be sustained without support, there is a speculative attack and reserves are exhausted.
Although the first generation models have many nice features, they have difficulty explaining episodes such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992, in which the pound and the lira dropped out of the mechanism. In the first place, the timing of currency crises is very unpredictable. Second, there are often "discontinuous" jumps in exchange rates. Finally, the models assume that no steps are taken by the government to eliminate deficits.
These problems led to the development of second generation models. For example, Obstfeld (1996) (Reading 18) shows how a conditional government policy can lead to multiple equilibria -one without a speculative attack and one with a speculative attack. The existence of multiple equilibria and uncertainty about the timing of an attack permit a discontinuous jump in the exchange rate. The outcome of the attack depends on the resources the government is willing to commit to maintain the exchange rate.
As in the banking crisis literature, equilibrium selection is an important issue. We have already mentioned the work of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) on global games.
Their work shows that the existence of multiple equilibria depends on the players having common knowledge about the fundamentals of the game. Introducing noise ensures that fundamentals are no long common knowledge and thus prevents the coordination that is essential for multiplicity. Morris and Shin (1998, reprinted as Reading 19) make the important step of showing how this global games approach can be applied to the analysis of currency crises. This approach leads to uniqueness of equilibrium which in turn allows comparative static policy analysis.
Despite Kaminsky and Reinhart's (1999) Chang and Velasco introduce money as an argument in the utility function. The central bank controls the ratio of currency to consumption. Different exchange rate regimes correspond to different rules for regulating the currency-consumption ratio. There is no intrinsic uncertainty in these models: banking and currency crises are "sunspot" phenomena. In other words, there are at least two equilibria, a 'good' equilibrium and a 'bad' equilibrium. In the good equilibrium, impatient consumers withdraw early and receive the proceeds from short-term assets and patient consumers wait to withdraw and receive the proceeds from long-term assets. In the 'bad' equilibrium, every one believes a crisis will occur and tries to withdraw early and long-term assets have to be liquidated at a loss. Chang and Velasco (2001) show that the existence of the bad equilibrium depends on the exchange rate regime in force. In some regimes, only the 'good' equilibrium exists; in other regimes, there exists a 'bad' equilibrium in addition to the 'good' equilibrium. The selection of equilibrium, 'good' or 'bad,' is not explained or modeled.
There is a large literature on currency crises. Flood and Marion (1999) provide a good survey. Krugman (2000) contains a number of analyses of historic and recent currency crises. Fourçans and Franck (2003) is an excellent book on the subject. Chui and Gai (2005) explain the global games approach to analyzing crises.
V. Financial Contagion
Financial contagion refers to the process by which a shock in one part of the financial system spreads to other parts through a series of 'linkages.' There are many kinds of inter-linkages in the financial system. Interbank claims provide one channel of contagion.
If a bank fails, the financial institutions holding claims on the bank will be weakened.
Information provides another channel for contagion. A fall in prices on one market may be interpreted as a negative signal about fundamentals. If these fundamentals are common to other markets, the expected returns and hence prices on those markets will also fall. Similarly, if one currency depreciates, other countries with common fundamentals may find that their currency also depreciates.
Banks are also linked together via payments systems. These linkages can facilitate contagion. Freixas and Parigi (1998) depositors have also withdrawn their funds. In other work, Rochet and Tirole (1996a) consider the role of the too-big-to-fail policy in preventing contagion. Furfine (2003) examines interbank payment flows in the US and concludes that the risk of contagion from this source is small. Financial linkages are modeled using an overlapping partnership structure. Each project requires two participants and each participant requires two projects, but partners are assigned to projects so that each individual has different partners for different projects. If one partner withdraws from a project, the project has to be abandoned; the other partner will want to withdraw from his second project, leaving the third partner with only one active project. This creates a domino effect that can spread throughout the system. In fact, the effect is instantaneous: when the probability that one's partner will withdraw becomes too large, all participants simultaneously withdraw. This is interpreted as a financial crisis. Rochet and Tirole (1996b) There is a growing literature on contagious currency crises and international contagion. Masson (1999) provides a good overview of the basic issues. He distinguishes between 'monsoonal' effects, spillovers and pure contagion. Monsoonal effects occur when there are major economic shifts in industrial countries that impact emerging economies. Spillovers occur when there are links between regions. Pure contagion occurs when there is a change in expectations unrelated to fundamentals. This type of contagion is associated with multiple equilibria. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and Glick and Rose (1999) provide evidence that trade linkages are important factors in the spread of many currency crises. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) consider the long history of cross-border contagion and consider why it occurs in some cases, but not in other similar situations.
Contagion in financial markets is studied by King and Wadwhani (1990) 
Concluding Remarks
This brief introduction has sampled the rich and varied literature on financial crises. The articles we have selected for this volume provide important insights into central issues and the evidence and models used to analyze them. Despite the size and scope of the literature, much work remains to be done before these important phenomena are fully understood. Table 1 of Bordo et al. (2001)) All countries 1880-1913 1919-1939 1945-1971 1973-1997 1973-1997 
